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ROBERT KURTH and LAURA KURTH
individually, and as Trustees
of the Kurth Revocable Trust,

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
WIARDA

Plaintiffs/Appellees,
Case No. 981582-CA

vs.
DANIEL R. WIARDA, individually,
and LONETREE SERVICES, INC., a
Utah corporation, d.b.a. LONETREE
LOG HOMES,

Argument Priority: (15)
)
)

Defendants/Appellants.

JURISDICTION
This civil appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court
under Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 (3) (a) (1953, as amended), and was
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals on October 20, 1998.
STATEMENT of ISSUES
ISSUE NO. 1:

Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney

fees and costs against the Appellant, Wiarda, individually, where the jury returned
a verdict of no liability on all claims, including, wrongful lien.
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STANDARD of REVIEW:

The Appellate Court will defer to

the trial court's findings, unless shown to be "clearly erroneous", or the Court
otherwise reaches "a definite and firm conviction77 that a mistake has been made.
See Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonouqh v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996);
Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350 (Utah 1996); and State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Factual findings made by the trial court
will be upheld unless "clearly erroneous", while legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness. See Mostronq v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154
(Utah App. 1993).

When reviewing the correctness of legal conclusions, no

deference is accorded to the trial court.

See Tim v. Dewsnup, 920 P.2d 1381

(Utah 1996).
ISSUE NO. 2:

Whether the trial court erred in determining that

Appellees were the prevailing party as against Appellant, Wiarda, and in its
calculation and apportionment of attorney fees and costs.
STANDARD of REVIEW:

Whether the trial court's theory of

recovery was proper raises a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.
See Van Dyke v. Shappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991). The reviewing court
may affirm a trial court's decision on any proper ground. See Meltrimble Real
Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 769
P.2d 819 (Utah 1988).

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without

evidentiary foundation or if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law. See Cove
View Excavating and Construction Co. v. Flvnn, 758 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1988).
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ISSUE NO. 3:

Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney

fees and costs against Appellant, Wiarda, contrary to its findings and conclusions
that said Appellant was not liable on all claims and without entering sufficient
findings or conclusions that established personal liability.
STANDARD of REVIEW:

The Court of Appeals will grant

deference to the fact finder only when findings of fact are sufficiently detailed to
disclose the evidentiary basis for the Court's decision. See Woodward v. Fazio, 823
P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991). The Court of Appeals will defer to findings made by the
trial court if they are not clearly erroneous; however, the Court of Appeals will
exercise free review over the trial court's conclusions of law to determine whether
the trial court correctly stated the applicable law and whether legal conclusions are
sustained by the facts found. See Antil v. Antil, 908 P.2d 1261, 127 Idaho 954
(Idaho App. 1996).
ISSUE NO. 4:

Whether the evidence at trial supports the trial

court's award of attorney fees and costs against the Appellant Wiarda.
STANDARD of REVIEW:

The Utah Appellate Courts do not

take the trial court's factual findings lightly and, to successfully challenge the trial
court's findings of fact, Appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate and must
present every scrap of evidence which supports those findings. Once an Appellant
who has challenged the trial court's factual findings having established every pillar
supporting their adversaries' position, they must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence and show why those pillars fail to support the findings.
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See Oneida/SLIC

v. Oneida Cold Storage and Wearhouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994).
The standard of review in an action at law is that the findings of the trial court are
as binding on appeal, as the verdict of the jury, and if there is competent evidence
to support the trial court's findings, they will not be disturbed on appeal. See
Dismuke v. Cseh, 830 P.2d 188 (Okl. 1992).

However, the judge's factual findings

are not entitled to the more limited review afforded a jury verdict. See Haffer v. All
Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531 (Wyo. 1993).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutory provisions which Appellant believes to be applicable, but not
decisive, are as follows:
1.

Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-1 et. seq. (1953, as amended).

2.

Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1 et. seq. (1953, as amended).

3.

Utah Code Annotated § 16-10(a)-841 (1953, as amended).

Said statutory references are attached hereto as Addendas 5a, 5b and 5c.
STATEMENT of the CASE
NATURE of the CASE:

This action begins with the construction of a

large, custom log home in Iron County, State of Utah, where the Appellees were
dissatisfied with the workmanship and quality of materials and sued under various
claims for recovery. Lonetree Services, Inc., as a Utah corporation in good
standing, (hereafter "Lonetree"), initially incorporated in Utah in 1986, doing
business as Lonetree Log Homes, performed the construction. The Appellant,
Daniel R. Wiarda (hereafter "Wiarda"), was a licensed contractor, with fifteen years
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of experience in log home construction, and an officer and shareholder of Lonetree.
When Appellees became dissatisfied, they refused to make final payment, ordered
Lonetree and Wiarda off the project, and hired another contractor to complete the
project. Lonetree and Wiarda made demand for payment, filed a mechanic's lien
and initiated suit in October, 1995.
The mechanic's lien was released by order of the court on the 22nd day of
July, 1996. The matter went to trial in January, 1998, and the jury returned a
verdict of liability and awarded damages in the amount of Seven Hundred and
Forty-Five Thousand ($745,000.00) Dollars, as against Lonetree Services, Inc., but
returned a verdict of no liability on all claims, as against Appellant Wiarda. The trial
court reserved the issue of attorney fees, and after considering pleadings and
hearing argument of counsel, first entered judgment for attorney fees against
Lonetree Services, Inc., and then later, by interdelineation, changed its judgment
awarding attorney fees in the sum of Thirty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred TwentyOne Dollars and Ninety-Six Cents ($35,821.96) against Appellant Wiarda.
COURSE of PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION:

Lonetree and Wiarda

initiated suit in October, 1995, for Breach of Contract, Quantum Meruit, damages
for unjust enrichment and foreclosure of mechanic's lien. Appellees answered,
brought countersuit and then filed a separate complaint, which combined, alleged
some twenty-two different causes of action against Lonetree, the Appellant,
Wiarda, his wife, Carolyn Wiarda, and several other Defendants.
///
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Upon motions for summary judgment, all Defendants were dismissed except
for Lonetree and Appellant Wiarda, individually, and all claims were dismissed
except for Breach of Contract, Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing,
Breach of Warranty, Negligence, and Negligence per se, Fraud and
Misrepresentation, Wrongful Lien and for Punitive Damages. The cases were
consolidated in April, 1996, with Appellees designated as Plaintiffs and Lonetree and
Appellant Wiarda designated as Defendants.
After an eight day trial, commencing in January, 1998, the jury returned a
verdict of liability and awarded damages in the combined amount of Seven Hundred
and Forty-Five Thousand ($745,000.00) Dollars, as against Lonetree, but returned
a verdict of no liability on all claims as against Appellant Wiarda. Judgment was
entered on the verdict on March 24, 1998. The trial court reserved for further
argument Appellees claim for attorney fees. After considering further points and
authorities, hearing argument of counsel, the Court first rendered a Memorandum
Decision and then entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order against
Lonetree on the 24th day of April, 1998.
On June 17, 1998, the court entered a second Order with Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law with virtually the same language found in the Order of April
24, 1998, except to exclude Lonetree and award attorney fees against Appellant
Wiarda with some additional commentary in the form of handwritten remarks by
the trial court which attempt to explain the reason for the change in order, and this
appeal was taken. This appeal is brought in behalf of Appellant Wiarda challenging
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the trial court's Order, with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated June 17,
1998. It does not challenge the trial court's previous orders or the jury verdict as it
relates to Lonetree and Lonetree waives it claims on appeal.
STATEMENT of FACTS
In the fall of 1995, Appellees approached Wiarda (trial transcript at 46 and
1371), President of Lonetree, (trial transcript at 1362, trial exhibits D235, D253
and D254) , to supply and construct a log home shell as subcontractor, for a log
customized home, designed and commenced by Appellees.1 Wiarda submitted a
bid on behalf of Lonetree based upon the modified plans, which was accepted by
Appellees. A written contract was entered into (trial transcript at 1374 and 1375,
trial exhibits P4, P5 and D202), the Appellees made their initial deposit (trial
transcript at 83-84, trial exhibits P6 and P7) for material and raw stock or logs
were ordered to be milled and cut (trial transcript at 1395,1396, trial exhibit D212).
The contract did not provide for attorney fees (trial exhibits P4, P5 and D202).
Materials were delivered in the spring of 1996 (trial transcript at 1402 and 1404),
and construction continued on the project into the fall of that year (trial transcript
at 430). During construction, changes were made (trial transcript at 1381,14461453). Appellees occasionally expressed some dissatisfaction (trial transcript at
1415, 1418), primarily for what they perceived to be poor workmanship and delay.

1

Appellees had previously constructed a basement foundation for the log
home floor plan that they desired, but proceeded with the matter, as a work in
progress, requesting that Wiarda make modifications to their design, (trial
transcript at 42-44, 1374-1376).
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However, the parties continued to work together until construction was complete
(trial transcript at 622). A final disagreement arose when Appellees became
dissatisfied with how the interior had been stained and Lonetree and Wiarda w^re
ordered off the job 2 (trial transcript at 625). Demand was made for final payment
and when the same was refused, Lonetree and Wiarda filed a mechanic's lien on the
property (trial transcript at 1510-1514).
The mechanic's lien was prepared for the signature of Wiarda, who was the
licensed contractor and Lonetree, where Wiarda signed as its President and his
wife, Carolyn, attested in corporate form 3 (exhibit UA" to Plaintiffs' Verified
Complaint, trial exhibit P-258, Addendum 3c, attached).
Thereafter, Lonetree and Wiarda brought action for Breach of
Contract, Quantum Meruit, damages for unjust enrichment, and foreclosure of
mechanic's lien, and Appellees answered, brought counterclaim and then a separate
complaint asserting twenty-two different claims, including but not limited to, Breach
of Contract, Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Breach of Warranty, Negligence
and Negligence Per Se, Fraud and Misrepresentation, Wrongful Lien, and for
Punitive Damages, which claims went to trial.

2

The parties disagree as to whether Lonetree and Wiarda were ordered off
the job or whether Lonetree and Wiarda refused to sand blast and restain, (see trial
transcript at page 622).
3

The trial court's interdelinated comments of its Order with Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law of June 17, 1998, state that the lien was filed by Dan
Wiarda and not Lonetree Services, Inc., therefore the Judgment is entered against
Dan Wiarda individually, as to attorney fees and court costs, which is inconsistent
with what the document states (see record at 1363, addendum 2c, attached).
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After an eight day trial, the jury returned a verdict of liability as against
Lonetree; more particularly, for Breach of Contract, Breach of Duty of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing, and/or Breach of Warranty, Lonetree was determined to be liable
with no amount designated; for Negligence and/or Negligence Per Se, Lonetree was
found liable and damages were awarded in the amount of Five Hundred and FortyFive Thousand Dollars ($545,000.00); for Fraud and/or Misrepresentation,
(Misrepresentation being circled) Lonetree was found to be liable and damages
awarded in the amount of One Hundred and Twenty Thousand Dollars
($120,000.00), and; regarding Punitive Damages, Lonetree's conduct was
determined to warrant an award of punitive damages of Eighty Thousand Dollars
($80,000.00), (jury verdict, record at 1055-1060, addendum l b , attached).
Neither Lonetree nor Wiarda, were determined to be liable for filing a
wrongful lien and Wiarda, individually, was found not liable on all of Appellees
claims. Id.
It was further determined by the jury that Appellees were not liable for the
claim for Breach of Contract asserted by Lonetree and Wiarda. Since it had been
previously ordered by the court on the 22nd day of July, 1996, that the mechanic's
lien be released, (Order Releasing Lien, record at 359-361, addendum 3a,
attached), no jury verdict was rendered upon the question of whether or not
///
///
///
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the mechanic's lien was proper or could be foreclosed, except for the jury's
determination that the lien was not wrongful. 4
Judgment on the Verdict (record at 1297-1300, addendum l a , attached),
was prepared by counsel for Appellees and entered by the Court on the 24 th day of
March, 1998, making the following order, judgment and decree:
1.
That ail claims of Plaintiffs as against Daniel
R. Wiarda, individually, as set forth in this matter,
shall be and they hereby are, dismissed with
prejudice and upon the merits. Id. at Hi.
(emphasis added).

7.
That all claims of Daniel R. Wiarda, individually,
and of Defendant Lonetree Services, Inc., a Utah
Corporation, d/b/a Lonetree Log Homes, pertaining
to unjust enrichment, breach of contract, Mechanics'
Lien and any other claims, against Plaintiffs, Robert
Kurth and Laura Kurth, individually, and as Trustees
of the Kurth revocable trust, should be and they
hereby are, dismissed, with prejudice and upon the
merits. Id. at H 7.
8.
That as against Defendants Lonetree Services,
Inc., a Utah Corporation, d/b/a Lonetree Log Homes,
Plaintiffs' claims of wrongful lien should be and they
hereby are dismissed with prejudice and upon the
merits. Id. at H 8.

4

Since the mechanic's lien had been released and the issue of attorney fees
reserved at trial, there is little discussion in the trial transcript regarding either.
Those places where discussed in the transcript are included as addendum 5d.
attached. While Appellant concedes that the discussion between attorney and the
bench is inconclusive on the issues, the dialogue suggests that the trial judge at the
time of trial gave instructions number 52 and 53, for claim for wrongful lien and
contracting parties, as an indicator as to whether or not he would award attorney
fees and against whom.
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9.
That Plaintiffs Robert Kurth and Laura Kurth,
individually, and as Trustees of the Kurth revocable
trust, should be and they hereby are, awarded their
costs of court incurred in connection with these
proceedings, as against Lonetree Services, Inc., a
Utah Corporation, d/b/a Lonetree Log Homes, said
costs to be taxed in accordance with the law. Id.
at H 9. (emphasis added.)
10.
That Plaintiffs, having prevailed in Defendants'
action to enforce a mechanic's lien, are entitled to
an award of attorney fees, pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, 38-1-18 (1953, as amended). The same
to be fixed by the court and taxed as costs upon
appropriate application. Id. at H 10.
On or about the 7th day of April, 1998, the Court entered its Memorandum
Decision, (record at 303-310, addendum 2a, attached), finding that:
...in as much as Plaintiffs' prevailed against
Defendant Lonetree Services, Inc., at trial, and
this court executed a Judgment on Verdict on
March 24, 1998, ordering the claims against Plaintiff's
pertaining to unjust enrichment, Breach of Contract,
and Mechanic's Lien to be dismissed, this Court finds
Plaintiffs to be entitled to reasonable attorney fees
and costs in an amount of Thirty Thousand Two
Hundred and Thirty-Three Dollars and Seventy-Six
Cents, ($30,233.76), which is supported by the
following findings and conclusions. Id. at 310,
H 2nd. (emphasis added).
The trial court then apportioned fees based upon the number of claims
prevailed upon, six, in comparison to the twenty-two original claims asserted. The
calculation did not take into account the fact that Appellant, Wiarda, had prevailed
on all claims, and that Lonetree had been determined not liable for wrongful lien,
liable but no damages awarded for Breach of Contract, Breach of Duty of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing, and Breach of Warranty, on the jury verdict form. Further,
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the court did not take into account the fact that upon the claims prevailed upon by
Appellees, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Fraud or Misrepresentation, and Punitive
Damages, there is no statutory or contractual basis for an award of attorney fees.
The court's memorandum decision further fails to designate with clarity, which, if
either of the Defendants would be specifically liable. The rationale of the court
strongly suggests an award of attorney fees against Lonetree, the rationale of the
court breaks down entirely if Appellant Wiarda is added into the calculation or was
intended as the sole party against whom attorney fees would be awarded.
On the 24 th day of April, 1998, the Court entered Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order consistent with its memordandum decision and
awarding fees and costs against Lonetree (record at 1313-1320, addendum 2b,
attached). On the 17th day of June, 1998, (record at 1356-1363, addendum 2c,
attached), the trial court entered an Order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, which mirrors, for the most part, the same paragraphs of its previous Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, except for additions made by
interdelineation, and increased the award from Thirty Thousand Two Hundred and
Thirty-Three Dollars and Seventy-Six Cents ($30,233.76) to Thirty-Five Thousand
Eight Hundred Twenty-One Dollars and Ninety-Six Cents ($35,821.96) and
designating most importantly Appellant Wiarda liable in place of Lonetree. The
added written comments by the court suggest that the change was based upon the
court's erroneous assumption that the mechanic's lien was filed by Appellant Wiarda
individually and not on behalf of Lonetree.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant Wiarda brings this appeal to challenge the trial court's
award of attorney fees against him personally.

Appellant asserts that the trial

court erred in not recognizing Appellant as the prevailing party at trial. Appellant
asserts that the trial court's calculation of attorney fees offers no rational legal
basis, since the claims by Appellees on which they prevailed, do not provide for
attorney fees statutorially or contractually.
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees, that
could not be reasonably differentiated for defense of the mechanic's lien from other
claims prosecuted or defended by Appellees in the context of multiple claims and
parties, and complex litigation.

Appellant Wiarda contends that the trial court

erred in concluding that Appellant Wiarda was solely and individually responsible for
the filing of the mechanic's lien and that as a result of such filing should be liable for
attorney fees relating to the entire litigation, even though the mechanic's lien had
been released prior and was not litigated as an issue at trial. While Utah Code
Annotated 38-1-18 (1953, as amended), provides for the recovery of attorney fees
to the prevailing party, this Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in not
acknowledging the jury's verdict that the lien was not wrongful, that this Appellant
was found not liable on all claims, and that by the trial court's previous order, the
mechanic's lien had been released.
Appellant Wiarda asserts that the trial court went beyond the evidence
presented, or erroneously concluded from its own interpretation of the evidence,
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including its review of the documents filed and its own previous orders, that the
Appellant Wiarda was solely and individually liable. The Appellant asserts that the
court's rationale and assessment is flawed, both from its factual determination and
legal analysis and cannot survive the scrutiny of the Court of Appeals, whether
applying the ''clearly erroneous" or "correctness" standard of review.
ARGUMENTS
POINT NO. I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT
APPELLEES WERE THE PREVAILING PARTY AS
AGAINST APPELLANT WIARDA.
The result of the trial court's rationale in its Memoradum Decision determines
the Appellees to be the prevailing party by reason of the jury verdict award, as
against Lonetree (see addendum 2a, at page 1, record at 1310), and then makes
its own calculation for the reasonable amount of attorney fees to award Appellees.
Although the memorandum decision is not specific as to the responsible or liable
party, the court's reasoning is clearly directed towards Lonetree. If Appellant
Wiarda was contemplated by the court as the responsible party, its calculation and
analysis would have been different. It is only upon the trial court's final
consideration and mistaken assumption that Wiarda individually filed the
mechanic's lien that it changed the final order.
The difficulties in the rationale stem from the difficulties in the circumstances.
The trial court found and concluded that the issues in the case were unusually
complex and intertwined, that a substantial amount of discovery was conducted,
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that the accounting by counsel for Appellees did not reflect a precise amount of
time spent on each cause of action and that it would not be common for attorneys
to keep records in such a manner (memorandum decision, record at 1308-1309,
addendum 2a, attached). Counsel for Appellees acknowledged in their affidavits
that an equitable apportionment was in order, since time spent on each cause of
action could not be distinguished and many of the claims were intertwined (record
at 180 and 1284, Affidavits attached as addendas 4a and 4b). The trial court made
an equitable calculation by awarding 6/22, or twenty-seven (27%) percent,
(accounting for six of twenty-two causes of action, which the court believed were
prevailed upon), and reducing the fees accordingly, (memorandum decision, record
at 1307-1308, addendum 2a, attached).
The court awarded costs in the amount of Twelve Thousand Four Hundred
and Sixty-Five Dollars and Ninety-Eight Cents ($12,465.98), (memorandum
decision, record at 1304-1307, addendum 2a, attached), which included sheriff
fees, investigative costs, a surety premium bond, postage and filing expenses, copy
expenses, witness fees, and deposition costs. While the court's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order of April 24, 1998, excluded the expert witness costs,
the same appear to have been included in the court's Order with Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law of June 17th 1998 (R at 1358, 1362, addendum 2c,
attached).
Section 38-1-18, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended), provides for
attorney fees to the prevailing party in a mechanic's lien action. The prevailing
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party includes those successful in defending the enforcement of such lien. See
Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969).

As mentioned

previously, whether the trial court's theory of recovery is proper, raises a question
of law, which the Court of Appeals reviews for correctness. See Van Dyke v.
Shappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991). The Court of Appeals may affirm on
any proper ground. See Meltrimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.. 758
P.2d 451, 456 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988).
In Penn Investment Co. v. Miller, 576 P.2d 883 (Utah 1978), the Utah
Supreme Court addressed the sole issue of an award of attorney fees regarding
foreclosure of a mechanics7 lien. In deciding that the Mechanics' Lien Statute
applied and that reasonable attorney fees should be awarded, the Supreme Court
gave some indication that there was a limitation for an award of attorney fees
where the mechanic's lien was not foreclosed as either a claim or a counterclaim.
The instant case presents the circumstance where the Supreme Court questioned
the statute's application since the mechanic's lien in this case was not in
controversey. There was no issue of foreclosure of the mechanic's lien at trial
because the same had been released by order of the court on July 22, 1996.
In general, attorney fees are only awardable if authorized by statute or
contract. Even if provided by contract, the award of attorney fees is allowed only in
accordance with the terms of the contract, or within the contemplation of the
statute, Travnerv. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984). Drawing a
comparison, the Utah Supreme Court in L & M Corp. v. Loader, 688 P.2d 448, 450
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(Utah 1984), found that where a contract was not subject to litigation, the
contractual provisions allowing for attorney fees were not applicable.
In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 754 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court set forth some practical guidelines for awarding attorney fees and
offered the scrutiny of four basic questions:
1.

What legal work was actually performed?

2.

How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to
adeguately prosecute the matter?

3.

Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates
customarily charged in the locality for similar services?

4.

Are their circumstances which require consideration of additional
factors, including those listing in the Code of Professional
Responsibility? Id. at 990. (emphasis added.)

While litigation can often be complex and involve numerous claims and
parties, the Utah Supreme Court, in attempting to guard against the abuse of
discretion, has scrutinized attorney fee awards. In Turtle Management, Inc., v.
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
When a Plaintiff has a substantial claim against
one Defendant, he should not have a free right
to assert claims against other Defendants with
the expectation that the target Defendant will
end up paying all attorney fees, even those
related to unsuccessful and perhaps frivolous
claims.
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In the instant case, the claims upon which Appellees prevailed, and received
an award of damages, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Fraud or Misrepresentation,
and for Punitive Damages, are not claims upon which attorney fees are generally
awarded statutorily per se. While there was a contract involved in this case, the
contract did not provide for attorney fees. Since the issue of foreclosure of the lien
was not an issue at trial, the only question on the jury verdict form that related to
the issue of lien was that of wrongful lien asserted by Appellees, upon which
Lonetree and Appellant Wiarda prevailed (jury verdict, record at 1058 and 1059,
addendum l b , attached).
POINT NO. II
THE MECHANIC'S LIEN AND NOTICE OF LIS
PENDENS WAS RELEASED BY PREVIOUS
ORDER OF THE COURT DATED THE 2 2 N D DAY
OF JULY, 1996, OVER A YEAR AND A HALF
PRIOR TO TRIAL.
Although it is difficult to speculate upon the court's reasoning for awarding
attorney fees against Appellant Wiarda, individually, it is clear from the record that
the mechanic's lien and lis pendens were released by the trial court's previous order
in July, 1996 (record at 359-362, addendum 3a, attached). Effectively, the
mechanic's lien, dated October 12, 1995, and recorded October 23, 1995, as Entry
No. 356460 in Book 545 at Pages 600-602, of the official records of the Iron County
Recorder's Office, constituted an encumbrance upon the property, if at all, only until
the 23rd day of July, 1996, when the trial court's order releasing the lien was
///
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recorded, as Entry No. 367485, in Book 573 at Pages 257-300 in said recorder's
office. Id.
By the time the matter went to trial in the end of January, 1998, the issue of
mechanic's lien foreclosure was no longer a part of the litigation and was not an
issue at trial. The mechanic's lien had been released just after Appellees had
retained the services of attorney Willard Bishop to serve as co-counsel. The expert
witness testimony and the fees related thereto went to the issues of workmanship
and quality of material and did not address a defense to the foreclosure of the
mechanic's lien. Most of the litigation costs and discovery expenses were incurred
after the mechanic's lien had been released. It appears clearly beyond the scope of
legislative intent allowing for the recovery of attorney fees in an action for
foreclosure of a mechanic's lien to allow for the award of attorney fees for discovery
and litigation, including a jury trial, that occurred more than a year and a half after
the release of the lien.
Pursuant to the final paragraph of the order releasing lien, Lonetree and
Appellant Wiarda were barred from further action or foreclosure on the lien, it
reads:
It is further ordered, that each and every Defendant
in this action shall be forever denied from having
any and all possessory rights and be prohibited from
asserting any claims whatsoever in or to said real
property of which the Plaintiff's claim or otherwise
hold an interest therein. Id. at H 5.
Consequently, Appellant Wiarda asserts that the trial court erred in
determining that attorney fees should be awarded for causes of action which
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otherwise would no allow for the recovery of attorney fees, based upon the
statutory language of 38-1-18 (1953, as amended) when foreclosure of a
mechanic's lien was no longer an issue in controversy at trial or during most of the
period of discovery.
In addition, Appellant Wiarda asserts that the issue of attorney fees, if it
were to be addressed, should have been addressed in the court's previous order
releasing the mechanic's lien, or at the very least, the issue reserved for trial, so as
to put Lonetree and Appellant Wiarda on notice prior to the time of trial. No such
language exists in the order.

Appellant Wiarda asserts that the issue of recovery

of attorney fees, pursuant to a mechanic's lien theory of recovery was waived at
the time that the lien was released and should not have been used by the court
following trial as its basis for such an award. Appellant Wiarda further asserts that
while the trial court's calculation of attorney fees is questionable both as to its legal
basis and factual determination, complicated in part by depositions, witness fees,
expert witness expenses, and additional representation at the time of trial, the
calculation of attorney fees at the time the mechanic's lien was released is a
comparatively simple calculation that can be determined by scrutinizing the billings
of attorney Robert 0. Kurth, Jr., which were previously itemized and provided to
the court, (see record at 1187, 1285, addendum 4a, attached.)
Since Appellees initially filed an answer and asserted a counterclaim in
response to the initial complaint filed by Lonetree and Appellant Wiarda, and since
there is considerable duplication in the assertion of the counterclaim and the
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additional separate causes of action, the attorney fees incurred in defending the
initial complaint can be readily determined from those in bringing the separate
complaint, without having to go into the equitable analysis and rationale of the trial
court in rendering its memorandum decision. The total fees generated by attorney
Kurth, up to the release of lien, appear to be Two Thousand Six Hundred ThirtyFour Dollars and Fifty Cents ($3,910.50), and those that appear to relate to the
defense of the mechanics' lien are Two Thousand Two Hundred Forty-Nine Dollars
and Fifty Cents ($2,964.50). The total fees generated by attorney Bishop, up to
the release of lien, appear to be One Hundred and Eighty ($180.00) Dollars.
POINT NO. HI
THE TRIAL COURT'S CALCULATION AND
APPORTIONMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES IS FLAWED
BOTH IN ITS LEGAL ANALYSIS AS WELL AS ITS
FACTUAL DETERMINATION.
In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 1985 (Utah 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court made it clear the that trial court enjoys broad discretion in
evaluating the evidence to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee. What
constitutes a reasonable fee is not necessarily controlled by any set formula. See
Wallace v. Build, Inc.. 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 (1965). However, an award
of attorney fees must generally be made on the basis of findings; cf fact, supported
by the evidence and appropriate conclusions of law. See Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985). What is reasonable depends upon a number of factors.
The Court has upheld a trial court's determination of a middle ground position
between two estimates of what constituted a reasonable fee. See Alexander v.
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Brown, 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982). But if the fees are determined to be reasonable,
they are reluctant to reduce the same simply because they appear to be
disproportionate to the overall result or determination of the litigation in question.
See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 964 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988).
In the instant case, the sole legal theory upon which attorney fees were
awarded was based upon the Mechanic's Lien statute. However, it goes beyond
any reasonable or rational basis to apply the statutory provisions to circumstances
relating to this case, where the mechanic's lien had in fact been released prior to
trial and also prior to the time when most of the discovery costs were incurred in
preparation for trial; where the claims prevailed upon at trial did not independently
provide for attorney fees; where no evidence was presented at trial for determining
an amount or the reasonableness of attorney fees; where the only issue presented
at trial relating to lien foreclosure involved Appellees' claim for wrongful lien, upon
which Lonetree and Wiarda prevailed; where findings submitted by Appellees for
Judgment on the Verdict included a finding that Appellant Wiarda was not liable on
all claims of Appellees, and; where no substantial findings were made in support
the trial court's legal conclusion that Appellant Wiarda solely and individually filed
the mechanic's lien.
POINT NO. IV
SINCE THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS NOT
PRESENTED AT TRIAL AS PART OF THE MEASURE
OF DAMAGES, IT IS FAIR TO CONCLUDE THAT THE
JURY ASSUMED THAT ITS AWARD OF DAMAGES
INCLUDED ATTORNEY FEES AS PART OF THE
ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES SUSTAINED.
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In Glezof v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1995), the Utah
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of additional damages for actual attorney fees
in the context of a claim for liquidated damages. In that case, evidence of the
amount incurred in attorney fees in defending a forfeiture was presented at trial in
the context of a contractual provision found within a deed of trust allowing a
percentage of the remaining balance for attorney fees as liquidated damages.
Addressing the matter from a standpoint of compensatory damages, the Court of
Appeals stated that while the contract entitles the party to the attorney fees "it
incurred, and under the above authority, those fees should be considered part of
the actual damages... sustained. However, the fees should not be awarded as
additional compensatory damages, as this would be duplicative." Id. at 1236.
In short, if the measure of damages presented to the jury at the time of trial
as compensation for damages is to be considered complete and all inclusive, then
the award of attorney fees would be additional and duplicative to the compensatory
damages determined. In other words, Appellees would recover twice, once for
compensatory damages awarded by the jury and again for attorney fees awarded
by the trial court. The award itself would be inconsistent with the jury verdict.
POINT NO. V
THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER WITH FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DATED JUNE
17th , 1998, IS INCONSISTENT WITH AND
IRRECONCILABLE TO ITS PREVIOUS ORDERS,
CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS.
///
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The trial court's order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law filed June
17th, 1998 is interesting when considered on its face and in light of the court's
previous rulings and findings. The language is virtually identical to the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order filed April 24, 1998, except to make Appellant
Wiarda liable as opposed to Lonetree, increased the award from Thirty Thousand
Two Hundred, Thirty-Three Dollars and Seventy-Six Cents ($30,233.76) to ThirtyFive Thousand, Eight Hundred, Twenty-One Dollars and Ninety-Six Cents
($35,821.96) (presumably to include the expense of expert witness fees of James
Smith and Antone Thompson as costs), and included some comments by
interdelination. Pursuant to paragraph 8 thereof, after identifying the Mechanic's
Lien statutory provision for recovery of attorney fees to the successful party, the
trial court states:
....This court finds that, in dismissing the claim
against Plaintiffs pertaining to the Mechanics7 Lien
the Plaintiffs are the successful party and are
therefore statutorially entitled to be awarded
reasonable attorney fees, against the party who
filed the lien. In this case, the lien was filed by
Dan Wiarda and not Lonetree Services, Inc.,
therefore, judgment is entered against Dan
Wiarda, individually, as to attorney fees and
court costs, (record at 1361, Addendum 2c)
(the underlined portion represents the additions
by the trial court's interdeliniation).
It should be noted that there was no hearing or finding regarding Appellant
Wiarda prior to this determination. At the time of trial, the jury, supposedly the
trier of fact in the case, was not asked to make such a factual determination. In
reviewing the evidence, Wiarda testified that the mechanic's lien was filed because
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Appellees refused to pay Lonetree's final bill, (trial transcript at 1508-1514). The
document itself bears the signature of Dan Wiarda, who was a general contractor
and Dan Wiarda as President of Lonetree Services, Inc., attested to in corporate
form by its secretary, Carolyn Wiarda. (Trial exhibit P-258, addendum 3c,
attached.)
When compared to the court's previous Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order, of April 24, 1998, the rest of the language of the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order of June 17, 1998, are virtually the same, except to
conclude that attorney fees and costs be awarded against one Defendant as
opposed to the other. (Record at 1313-1320).

While the rationale of the trial

court's memorandum decision filed April 7, 1998, does not specifically mention
Lonetree or Appellant Wiarda, the basis of the court's analysis is clearly directed
toward Lonetree and consistent with the conclusions reached in the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order filed April 24, 1998. However, the
memorandum decision noticeably fails to even mention in its analysis the
interdelineated finding that so radically changed the result of the court's Order with
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated June 17, 1998. Had the court fully
appreciated the significance of this unsubstantiated finding regarding Appellant
Wiarda, one can only assume that the court would have reviewed its previous
orders and findings to try and decide the remaining issue consistently.
However, the prior findings and rulings of the trial court are in fact
inconsistent with this final order. For instance, on March 24, 1998, there was filed
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by the court judgment on the verdict prepared by Appellees7 counsel, (record at
1297-1300). The first paragraph thereof states clearly that as to aH claims of
Plaintiffs (this presumably included those decided and to be decided) against Daniel
R. Wiarda, individually, the same were dismissed with prejudice and upon the
merits. Paragraph ten of the same document made clear that the court was
contemplating a claim for an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 38-1-18 (1953, as amended), yet no qualification was made
upon the dismissal of Wiarda.
Similarly, the court failed to take into account the fact that it had previously
released the mechanics7 lien on July 22, 1996 (record at 359-362). Therefore, the
court's reasoning for applying the statutory remedy for attorney fees deserved
further findings substantiating its application. Again, the memorandum decision
makes no reference to this disparity in the court's analysis or assessment.
At the time of trial, the dialogue between the attorneys and the court in
discussing jury instructions and the form of the verdict, suggests that the court was
interested in separating the claim for wrongful lien for purposes of determining
whether attorney fees should be awarded. Regarding whether or not instruction
no. 32 should be given the following dialogue took place:
Mr. Jackson:

I don't think we've got a wrongful
lien claim and I don't think there's-

Attorney Kurth:

I know that we do, I know that our
counterclaim initially, well the
Defendants were the Plaintiffs and
they filed the Complaint to foreclose.

///
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In our counterclaim we asserted that
the lien was wrongful.
The Judge:

Can you find that? As much as I hate
to ask that.

Attorney Kurth:

It's probably in my car outside (short
inaudible, two speakers.)

The Judge:

I'll tell you what, let's keep going
unless you've got one right there.
(Inaudible discussion among attorneys.)

The Clerk:

(Short inaudible, no mic.)

The Judge:

Okay.

Mr. Bishop:

What, are you still here?

The Judge:

We're making progress without you.

Mr. Bishop:

Should I go back out there?

The Judge:

Go back out in the lobby.

Mr. Bishop:

I've got to stand so that I can open
the door when its gets here.

The Judge:

Oh, Okay.

Mr. Bishop:
Mr. Jackson:

It's locked.
Answer to counterclaim. We have
non-compliance with plans, specifications, building code, unjust
enrichment, offset, expungment of
lien and punitive damages.

Attorney Kurth:

What does the first one say?

Mr. Jackson:

The first one?

Attorney Kurth:

If I named it specifically.
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Mr. Jackson:

Common allegation.

Attorney Kurth:

Wrongful lien, first cause of action.
Our basis for that is the statute
provides for attorney fees. I wouid
think just— well looking at the
instruction I guess concerning
mechanic's liens, and if you defend
a mechanic's lien you're successful.

Mr. Jackson:

Well, butWell, that cuts both ways. If you
prevail, you get attorney fees, if
you prevail, you get yours.

The Judge:

Attorney Kurth:

Well, that's another instruction,
but there is, we do have a
wrongful lien claim.

The Judge:

Okay. And that's their first claim?

Mr. Jackson:

It's designated (short, inaudible,
two speakers.)

The Judge:

All right, let's use this as number 52,
Attorneys' fees concerning mechanic's
lien or wrongful lien (trial transcript
at 2030-2032).

Up to that point, at the time of trial, it seemed evident that the jury's factual
determination on the issue of wrongful lien would become the key factor in
determining whether to award attorney fees. The court obviously reconsidered its
position in issuing its memorandum decision, at least to the point of finding that
Appellees were the prevailing party, notwithstanding the jury's response on the jury
verdict form, to the issue of wrongful lien.
///
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The court's review of the mechanic's hen and its interpretation is more a legal
question than an factual question. Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-1, et seq. (1953,
as amended), provides the statutory provisions regarding mechanic's hens, Section
3 that:
contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing
any services or furnishing or providing any materials or
equipment used in the construction shall.... have a hen
upon the property upon or concerning which they have
rendered service, performed labor...acting by his authority
as agent, contractor or otherwise.
Section 7, sets forth the contents of the Notice of Claim and subsection (e)
thereof addresses the signature of the hen claimant, identifying that the same could
be done by the claimant or its authorized agent.
In the notice of hen itself, Dan Wiarda identifies himself as the undersigned,
doing business as Lonetree Log Homes, and as the President of Lonetree Services,
Inc., as the one asserting the hen by reason of materials provided and services
rendered to Appellees. The contract with Appellees was with Lonetree. Appellant
Wairda was identified on the contract as the authorized agent of the corporation.
Wiarda's actions were those of the corporation.

Appellant Wiarda is entitled to the

protections of the Utah Code limiting liability of corporate officers and directors. At
Utah Code Annotated § 16-10a-841 (1953, as amended), it states that a
corporation may "eliminate or limit the liability of a director to the corporation, or to
its shareholders for monetary damages for any action taken or any failure to take
any action as a director

"

///
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A corporation and its stockholders are presumed separate and distinct,
whether the stockholders are many or only one. In Utah it is recognized that a
corporation and its shareholders are separate and distinct legal entities and has
validated the purpose of such a distinction to insulate the stockholders from the
liabilities of the corporation, thus limiting their liability to only the amount the
stockholders voluntarily put at risk. Schafir v. Harriqan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App.
1994), see also Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Construction Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah
App. 1988). In Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah
1979), the Utah Supreme Court established a two-prong test in deciding when to
pierce the corporate veil:
In order to disregard the corporate entity, there must
be a concurrence of two circumstances:
1)
There must be such unity of interest in ownership
that the separate personalities of the corporation and the
individual no longer exist, Viz, the corporation is, in fact,
the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and
2)
Observance of the corporate form would sanction
a fraud, promote injustice, or, an inequitable result would
follow. Id. at 1030.
Other states have established a similar bench mark. See Rowland v. LaPiere,
662 P.2d 1332 (Nev. 1982). In Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 fUtah App. 1987),
the Utah Court of Appeals identified certain significant factors, which although not
conclusive, were key for consideration: (1) undercapitalization of a one-man
corporation; (2) failure to observe corporate formalities; (3) non-payment of
dividends; (4) syphoning of corporate funds by the dominate stockholder; (5) non-
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functioning of other officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the
use of the corporation as a facade for operations of a dominate stockholder; and
(8) the use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice or fraud. Id. at 786.
In the instant case, although Appellees have asserted more than twenty-two
different causes of action against Lonetree and Wiarda, there is no allegation,
assertion or claim, attempting to pierce the corporate veil, or attempting to
establish the business operation of Lonetree as a sham or fraud, or attempting to
show undercapitalization, or any other factor considered significant in such an
inquiry. Moreover, at the time of trial, there was no evidence presented regarding
issues related to piercing of the corporate veil. Through the course of the
proceedings, at trial, or after, there has not been a single finding made by the court
in its various orders and rulings which attempts to challenge the validity of Lonetree
as a Utah Corporation in good standing, which was in fact established at trial, by
evidence that went uncontroverted. (trial transcript at 1367, trial exhibits D-235,
D-253 & D-254).
It has been the standing policy of the Courts of Appeal in the State of Utah,
that the corporate veil which protects stockholders and officers from individual
liability, will be pierced only reluctantly and cautiously. See Colman, 743 P.2d at
786. Finally, while it is difficult to see how individual liability could be found without
at least addressing the issue of corporate status, it is clear from the court's
memorandum decision, that such a consideration was not part of the trial court's
rationale or analysis in rendering its decision.
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In reviewing the pleadings, the analysis of the court, the record, and the
evidence presented at trial, it seems clear to Appellant Wiarda that after the jury
awarded such a substantial award of damages against Lonetree, the trial court
believed that attorney fees were warranted, notwithstanding the jury's
determination on the question of wrongful lien. Since the court had made a finding
that Appellees had prevailed on the claims asserted by Lonetree and Wiarda, the
court based it rationale for award on the mechanic's lien statute, not realizing that
the lien had in fact been released by its own previous order and anticipating that
the award would be directed against Lonetree. The court's analysis in its
memorandum decision strongly suggests that the Court had Lonetree in mind at
the party liable for the attorney fees. The court's judgment on the verdict confirms
that notion that there was no anticipation of Appellant Wiarda being responsible for
attorney fees, or the judgment on the verdict would have so stated.
The court's initial Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of April 24,
1998, represents the logical outcome of the court's analysis and reasoning. It
seems clear that sometime between the issuance of the court's initial Order and
subsequent Order, the court reconsidered its decision by reviewing the notice of lien
and came to the conclusion that the lien was filed by Dan Wiarda, individually, and
not as an agent or officer of Lonetree and that somehow this single additional
finding alone justified the change in attorney fee award from Lonetree to Appellant
Wiarda and assumed that its prior rationale and analysis would equally apply.
There are simply no facts presented at trial or made a part of the record that
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supports such a finding and the legal analysis is so skewed by the change that it is
in error, and one cannot have anything but a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.
POINT NO. VI
THE COSTS OF COURT ARE ALSO UNWARRANTED
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
Perhaps there is no clearer indication that the trial court had Lonetree in
mind when determining that Appellees were the prevailing party than when
addressing its findings regarding the award of costs and other expenses of
litigation. If it was clear in the court's mind that Appellant Wiarda was to be the
party to whom costs would be assessed, the rationale would have been entirely
different. Appellant Wiarda had prevailed on all of the twenty-two claims that were
asserted by Appellees and had only lost on its counterclaim for Breach of Contract.
For the assessment of court costs and expenses, including expert witness expenses,
there just does not seem to be the compelling basis for such an award if one
excludes Lonetree from the analysis. If the court had considered Appellant Wiarda
to be equally and jointly responsible, the calculations and the analysis of the court
would also have been different, both with regard to the attorney fees as with court
costs and expenses.
In addressing such costs, the court again identified the costs being assessed
against, in this case, the losing party of a civil action. Yet to identify Appellant
Wiarda as the losing party is contrary to the evidence and verdict. It is clear that
the court had in mind Lonetree as the losing party and from that standpoint the
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rationale of the court is reasonable. From the standpoint of witnesses fees, the
expert testimony of Smith and Thompson went to the issue of negligence.
However, Wiarda was the prevailing party on Appellees claims for negligence. The
same applies for deposition costs, for services costs and witness fees. As a result,
and for the same reasons asserted previously regarding the issue of attorney fees,
Appellant Wiarda asserts that the award for costs and expenses was also in error
and should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, Appellant Wiarda
prays that relief be granted in reversing the trial court's decision in awarding
attorney fees and costs against said Appellant, or that the same be remanded,
ordering that judgment be entered consistent with the evidence at trial and the
court's previous findings and conclusions, finding the Appellant Wiarda not liable on
all claims of Appellees and that the same be dismissed with prejudice and upon the
merits, together with such additional and further relief as this Court deems
appropriate.
DATED this

i

day of /) /^l/f/U^
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